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ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the idea that a faculty member acting in 
the role of an academic researcher in the scientific disciplines should be 
viewed in the context of patent law as an autonomous entity within the 
university rather than as an agent of the university. The structure of 
the university laboratory within the university and the social norms 
associated with the activities that members of the research laboratory 
conduct supports such a view. Additionally, the data from the 
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act reveal that universities and 
faculty scientists have different goals and motivations regarding the 
transfer of new technology to the private sector. Acknowledging a 
distinction between the university and its academic researchers would 
revive the application of the experimental use exception as a defense to 
patent infringement for the scientists who drive the innovation economy 
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of our country. Also important, this distinction has implications for 
the way that entrepreneurship is defined in the context of academic 
researchers. A better understanding of academic entrepreneurship may 
lead universities to restructure incentives to encourage academic 
researchers to participate in transferring new inventions from the 
laboratory to the private sector. 
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Dr. Anna Lucard, 1 a biomedical researcher at State University, 
holds the BigPharma® Endowed Chair in Molecular Biology. She 
spends much of her time on administrative duties such as her 
appointment as the chair of the Department. However, her driving 
force for entering academia was her research on genetic mutations 
that lead to breast cancer. Most of the funding for the research comes 
from government agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, 
but smaller amounts of money flow in from non-profit grants and 
industry collaborations. These multitudes of funding sources come 
with different benefits and drawbacks. Because of the availability of 
government funding, Dr. Lucard is able to explore avenues of research 
that do not seem to be immediately marketable. On the other hand, 
her industry collaborations help her feel as though she is making an 
immediate impact on the health of society, and has enabled her to buy 
a new multi-thousand dollar piece of equipment for general laboratory 
use. During that same period, Dr. Lucard has used government 
funding to isolate a genetic mutation and determined that it 
potentially could be used to screen for a particularly aggressive form 
of cancer. The university, which left her to plan, fund, and conduct 
her research on her own, is now pressuring her to patent the invention 
so that the university can license it to LittleBiotech ™. Dr. Lucard 
understands that she is required by law2 and by contract3 to disclose 
the new technology to the university, but she would prefer to publish 
the information to engage the scientific community and support her 
next grant rather than pursue a patent.4 She is unclear why the 
university is suddenly taking an interest in the technology developed 
during her research when its prior interest had been limited to the 
amount of overhead money she was bringing in to fund the building 
renovations. Some days, Dr. Lucard would just like to hide in her 
laboratory and forget that her university responsibilities exist. 
1. Dr. Lucard and her story are fictional but representative of many faculty members 
at universities across the United States. 
2. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)). 
3. Most universities have policies in place requiring faculty members to assign any 
inventions developed during employment by the university. See, e.g., DUKE UNIV., FACULTY 
HANDBOOK: POLICY ON INVENTIONS, PATENTS, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER P-9 (2008), available 
at http://olv.duke.edullnventors/PoliciesAndProcedures/policy_on_inventions.pdf. 
4. Dr. Lucard could both patent and publish the invention, but due to time restrictions 
and personal beliefs regarding ownership of publicly funded inventions, she may choose to focus 
on publication. For a fuller discussion of the choice between publications and patenting see infra 
Parts V.B and V.C. 
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Such is the life of many of today's academic researchers in the 
sciences. The university has become an increasingly commercial place 
with endowed chairs and licensing pressures.5 A researcher's one 
potential avenue of escape from that commercialization is her 
laboratory. In the laboratory, she alone determines what research will 
be conducted. She can choose to completely forgo commercial 
involvement by applying for federal grants rather than partnerships 
with industry-or not. The laboratory is her space to define. 
This faculty autonomy while acting in the role of scientific 
researcher has not been explicitly recognized. Instead, many scholars 
lament the death of pure research, or the realm of philosophy, due to 
the increased commercialization of the university in today's society.6 
In its most idealized form, the realm of philosophy is a place in which 
scientific research7 is conducted in an arena free from the pressures of 
commercialization,8 a stark contrast to the world of commerce. 9 If, as 
has been argued, the university is at heart a money-making corporate 
endeavor, 10 the realm of philosophy is certainly not to be found within 
its hallowed halls. Or is it? This Article seeks to unveil the 
distinction between the university and its academic researchers. It 
argues that the realm of philosophy continues to be found in the 
laboratories of the modern, more commercial university because each 
individual faculty scientist determines the degree of 
commercialization allowed into her laboratory. 
In discussing this distinction, it must be remembered that the 
university is not a monolithic structure. The university itself does not 
conduct research; academic researchers within the university conduct 
scientific research independently of the university in laboratories that 
function as independent entities within the university. 11 The 
structure of the university research system demonstrates the 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See, e.g., Joseph Mohr, Unshackle Academia and Allow it to Exemplify the Purpose of 
Patent Law: "To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts", 88 MARQ. L. REV. 671 
(2004). 
7. Philosophy refers to "natural philosophy," i.e., science. For a full discussion, see infra 
Part IV.D.l. 
8. One of the goals of creating a federally funded research system was to free scientists 
from the pressures of pursuing only research with commercial implications. See, e.g., OFFICE OF 
TECH. AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., A HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FEDERALLY 
FuNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS 2 {1995), available at 
http://www .fas.org/ota/reports/950 1. pdf. 
9. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 {1966). 
10. JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2005); see also Frank T. Rothaermel, Shanti D. Agung & Lin Jiang, University 
Entrepreneurship: A Taxonomy of the Literature, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 691, 707-709 (2007). 
11. See infra Part II.A. 
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independence of the academic researcher from the university.l2 
Additionally, an analysis of the results of the Bayh-Dole Act, 13 which 
Congress passed to incentivize the transfer of technology developed by 
federally funded research from the university to the private sector, 
further reveals the distinction between the university and its 
academic researchers. The different incentives and motivations that 
each group has for conducting research illustrate this distinction. 14 
Finally, courts interpreting patent law have recognized this implicit 
distinction in deciding some issues. 15 
Viewing the university and its academic laboratories and 
researchers as two distinct entities has a variety of implications for 
patent law as well as for university technology transfer.l6 First, the 
experimental use exception17 to patent infringement, thought to be 
inapplicable to university research since Madey u. Duke, 18 would once 
again be applicable to at least a subset of university research. Second, 
in light of this distinction, it may be time to redefine entrepreneurship 
in the context of academic researchers, recognizing that academic 
researchers are quite entrepreneurial but focus on goals and 
incentives quite different from the university at large. Based upon 
this new definition of entrepreneurship, universities may choose to 
modify the incentives to faculty for disclosing new inventions for 
transfer to private industry. 
This Article argues that, in the context of patent law and 
innovation policy, courts, scholars, and university administrators 
should view academic researchers and their research laboratories as 
distinct entities from the universities in which they reside. Part I 
analyzes the structure of the university laboratory and the social 
norms surrounding academic researchers to support this distinction 
between academic researchers and the larger university. Part II 
describes the differences in goals and incentives between the academic 
researcher and the university as revealed by reactions to the Bayh-
Dole Act. Part III details the implication of this distinction for the 
application of the experimental use exception to academic researchers 
12. See infra Part II.A. 
13. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)). 
14. See infra Part III. 
15. See infra Part II. C. 
16. University technology transfer as used in this article refers to the transfer of 
university-owned inventions to the private sector for further development and commercial 
litigation. 
17. 
18. 
See infra Section IV. 
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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in a university setting. Part IV describes the impact of the distinction 
on the discussion surrounding academic entrepreneurship and 
suggests ways to incentivize academic researchers to disclose new 
inventions to the university. 
I. THE STRUCTURE AND HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 
SYSTEM SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT THE UNIVERSITY OPERATES AS A 
DISTINCT ENTITY FROM ITS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHERS 
Faculties at universities play a number of different roles, 
including lecturer, researcher, and administrator. In many respects, a 
faculty member is a representative of the university. For instance, 
acting as an administrator, the faculty member is reasonably viewed 
as an agent of the university. Indeed, many scholars view the faculty 
as agents of the university in all aspects of university life. 19 However, 
the structure and history of the academic research system illustrate 
the idea that when acting in the role of academic researcher, faculty 
and other laboratory staff are not acting as agents of the university. 
A. University Research Laboratory Structure 
The structure of a research laboratory varies depending in 
large part on the organization within which it is situated. Industrial 
laboratories are generally organized according to departments, and 
the organization directs all research conducted in the laboratory.20 In 
contrast, university laboratories are generally organized around and 
run by a Principal Investigator who has a faculty appointment.21 The 
organization of a Principal Investigator-led laboratory varies based on 
the funding, space, and preferences of the Principal Investigator. 
Although a Principal Investigator has departmental or school 
associations, it is the Principal Investigator, rather than the school or 
department, who determines the research strategy for the laboratory, 
hires staff, and acquires the major grants that fund the laboratory. 22 
In this manner, academic laboratories function as autonomous units 
19. Richard A. Jensen, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Disclosure and Licensing 
of University Invention: 'The Best We Can Do with the S**t We Get to Work With," 21 INT'L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 1271, 1272 (2003), available at http://www.nd.edu/-rjensenllresearchl 
Disclosure.pdf. 
20. MICHAEL CROW & BARRY BOZEMAN, LIMITED BY DESIGN: R&D LABORATORIES IN THE 
U.S. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 93 (1998). 
21. Id. at 92. 
22. See, e.g., Dartmouth College Office of Sponsored Projects, Role of the Principal 
Investigator, http://www.dartrnouth.edu/-osp/resources/rnanuallpost-awardlpirole.htrnl (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
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within the university.23 Principal Investigator-run academic 
laboratories have been analogized to independent frrms, 24 and the 
Principal Investigator may be thought of as a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) who has ultimate control over the laboratory research. 25 
While a Principal Investigator conducts research in her 
laboratory, her laboratory likely includes a number of other academic 
researchers, as well, including research assistants, postdoctoral 
fellows, graduate research assistants, and research technicians. 26 
Research associates generally have a terminal degree and perhaps a 
faculty appointment. 27 Such researchers may work directly for the 
Principal Investigator, but often direct their own research projects 
within the laboratory.28 Postdoctoral fellows also have terminal 
degrees, but work in the laboratories in a journeyman type of 
position.29 Postdoctoral fellows have been trained to perform research 
and are continuing to hone those skills while developing skills in grant 
writing and other laboratory administrative functions in order to 
prepare to become Principal Investigators or research associates. 30 
Graduate research assistants work within the lab on a small aspect of 
the Principal Investigator's larger project.31 These are usually 
students enrolled in a university graduate program who will use the 
data collected in these apprenticeships to demonstrate the ability to 
conduct scientific research.32 Finally, most laboratories have at least 
one research technician, who works directly for the Principal 
Investigator on research projects or general lab maintenance.33 Thus, 
23. See Henry Etzkowitz, Research Groups as 'Quasi-Firms': The Invention of the 
Entrepreneurial University, 32 RES. POL 'y 109 (2003). 
24. Id. 
25. For an in-depth analysis of the Principal Investigator's control of the research 
conducted, see discussion on academic freedom infra Part II.B. 
26. See, e.g., Dartmouth College Office of Sponsored Projects: Role of the Principal 
Investigator, supra note 22. 
27. See, e.g., Simon Fraser University, Policies & Procedures, University Research 
Associate, http://www.sfu.ca/policies/researchlr50-0l.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
28. Id. 
29. See, e.g., American Cancer Society, Research Program & Funding: Postdoctoral 
Fellowships, http://www .cancer .org/docroot!RES/content!RES_5_2x_Postdoctoral_ 
Fellowships.asp?sitearea=RES (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Montana State University, Division of Graduate Education, Graduate 
Assistantships, http://www.montana.edu/wwwdg/cat__grad_assist.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 
2010). 
32. Id. 
33. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, 2010-11 Edition: Science Technicians, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl15.htm (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
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within any given laboratory, there is a mix of academic researchers 
who may be working for the Principal Investigator or quite 
independently. 34 
Funding for the laboratory generally comes from outside 
sources such as government agencies and nonprofits, which further 
illustrates the dichotomy between the university and faculty. 
Although universities will often provide start-up funds for new hires, 
faculty members in the sciences who do not procure outside funding 
quickly find themselves unable to hire any type of researchers, 
purchase reagents, or even have a complete salary.35 These grants are 
generally awarded in the name of the Principal Investigator's 
institution, but in practice are usually portable should the Principal 
Investigator move to a new institution.36 Once a grant is received, the 
university essentially becomes its landlord. Up to fifty percent of the 
grant money is paid to the university in indirect costs. Funds for 
indirect costs are used to pay for utilities, common equipment, 
administrative support, waste disposal, and the like. The money left 
after such deductions is deposited into the Principal Investigator's 
faculty account, which is then used for payment of laboratory-related 
expenses, including the salaries of other researchers m the 
laboratory. 37 
B. Scientific Norms and Academic Freedom 
The independent nature of the structure of the university 
laboratory is the basis for the discussion of the social norms 
surrounding the research conducted within the university. Those 
social norms illustrate the idea that academic researchers define a 
societal group distinct from the university as an organization. Such a 
distinct structure stands in contrast to scientific researchers at 
commercial organizations who act on behalf of the commercial 
34. Although some academic researchers operate independently within the Principal 
Investigator's laboratory so as to create a sort of mini-laboratory, this article confmes its 
discussion to Principal Investigators; however, proper evaluation of any given piece of research 
would require an analysis of who controls the project under which it was conducted. 
35. See, e.g., FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIS. OFFICE OF FIN., HARVARD UNIV., SPENDING 
POLICY FOR FACULTY START-UP AND OTHER FAS FACULTY SUPPORT FUNDS 1-4 (2008), available 
at http://www.finance.fas.harvard.edu/files/policies/Faculty_Start-up_Funds.pdf. 
36. University websites often have information regarding transfer of such grants. See, 
e.g., Oregon State University, Office of Sponsored Programs, Transferring a Grant or Change of 
Principal Investigator, http://oregonstate.edu/researchlosp/submission/transfergrant.htm (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
37. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, UNIV. OF MICH., POLICY STATEMENT ON THE USE 
OF FACULTY RESEARCH AND DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTS (2005), available at 
http://www. provost. umich.edu/reports/discretionary/policy _sta tement.html. 
2010] PATENT AND UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 481 
organization's interest. Social norms that are particular to academic 
researchers have long been recognized to drive the actions of and 
relationships between these individuals.38 Such norms include 
academic freedom and a lack of investment in the patent system in 
part growing out of the free sharing of research tools and materials as 
well as the publication of data in order to inform the public and other 
researchers of the results of current research. 39 
One of the strongest social norms among university faculty is 
the norm of academic freedom. Academic freedom began as the idea 
that a faculty member does not leave her opinions and thoughts at the 
door when in the employ of the university. 40 While initially developed 
in reference to discussions in a classroom setting, academic freedom is 
equally applicable to a faculty member's role as an academic 
researcher.41 A Principal Investigator has the power to decide what 
research projects to pursue and the manner in which to tackle the 
projects.42 
The norm of academic freedom is particularly important when 
contrasting academic research with commercial research, where the 
general practice is to work on specific problems with short-range 
profitability as the organization directs. Principal Investigators 
exercise the freedom to direct research based on personal interests 
without bias from the university's drive to commercialize any 
particular technology. This is not to say that academic researchers 
are generally against the commercialization of scientific research. 
When asked about university commercialization efforts, faculty are 
generally supportive, but not to the extent that they would give up 
academic freedom. 43 In fact, academic researchers so value the 
academic freedom norm that researchers will often accept lower 
salaries in order to have jobs that allow significant personal freedom 
38. E.g., NORMAN W. STORER, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF SCIENCE 3 (1966); WARREN 0. 
HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 9 (1965). 
39. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the 
Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009); Nikolaus 
Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An Exploration of 
Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL'Y 157 (2003). 
40. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
41. See, e.g., Dow Chern. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[Academic 
freedom] extends as readily to the scholar in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom."). 
42. Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatipont & Jeremy C. Stein, Academic Freedom, 
Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation, 39 RAND J. ECON. 617, 621 (2008). 
43. See Yong S. Lee, "Technology Transfer" and the Research University: A Search for the 
Boundaries of University-Industry Collaboration, 25 RES. POL'Y 843 (1996). 
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in the pursuit of a research agenda.44 As a result, academic freedom is 
one of the key reasons that scientists choose to enter academia rather 
than industry. 
An examination of the history of the governance of universities 
shows that faculties have fought for academic freedom when that 
freedom has been threatened.45 Although U.S. universities are 
modeled in large part after European universities, the two differ in 
their methods of governance. Members of the faculty traditionally 
govern European universities, thus ensuring that the faculty retains 
control of all aspects of the university. 46 In contrast, boards of 
trustees composed of non-academics historically govern U.S. 
universities.47 The early American institutions of Harvard University 
and the College of William and Mary began in the European tradition 
but rapidly adapted to the trustee model.48 A faculty-governed 
university stands in stark contrast to a laymen-governed university, 
as the latter structure distances the faculty from identifying as closely 
with the university as an organization. Fearing that such distant 
governance would put the direction of academic research in the hands 
of university administrators, faculties fought to regain some internal 
control and have succeeded in the context of academic freedom. 49 As 
discussed above, U.S. faculties have managed to retain the academic 
freedoms of their European counterparts.50 
A second social norm that distinguishes the university from its 
academic researchers is based on the generally accepted practice of 
conducting academic research in the shadow of the patent system 
without directly engaging the patent system. Recently, universities 
have become heavily involved in the licensing51 and enforcement52 of 
44. Aghion, Dewatipont & Stein, supra note 42, at 618 (discussing empirical work by 
Stern). 
45. See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 28-29; RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. 
METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 120 (1955). 
46. See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 28; HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 45, at 3-
11. 
47. See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 28-29; HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 45, at 
120. 
48. See WASHBURN supra note 10, at 28-29. 
49. ld. 
50. See discussion of academic freedom supra Part II.B. 
51. For a detailed discussion oflicensing under the Bayh-Dole Act, see infra Part liLA. 
52. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008). For an overview of initial data from a recent survey of 
patent litigation involving universities, see Chris Holman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo.-
Kansas City Sch. of Law, Presentation at Santa Clara University School of Law: University 
Patent Litigation (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.chtlj.org/sites/defaultlflles/media/ 
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patent rights. At the same time, academic researchers have continued 
to operate with their traditional disregard of the patent system and 
the university's goals. For example, in spite of a government 
requirement to disclose government-funded inventions to the 
university for licensing and the university's considerable interest in 
licensing such inventions, academic researchers routinely publish 
their inventions in scientific journals without university disclosure 
rather than spending the extra time required to also disclose the 
inventions to the university.53 
Additionally, because of the strong emphasis on free sharing of 
materials and data,54 academic researchers also adhere to a social 
norm of ignoring any patent rights related to a field of research. 55 One 
recent empirical study found that only 5 percent of academic 
researchers try to determine if their research projects might result in 
patent infringement. 56 This social norm may put the academic 
researcher at odds with a university that is trying to encourage the 
licensing of its own technology and is actively enforcing its own patent 
rights. In fact, universities and technology transfer offices advise 
academic researchers that ignoring patents covering one's research is 
patent infringement and could lead to liability, 57 usually to no avail. 
The research conducted in the laboratory most vividly 
illustrates the dichotomy between the faculty researcher and the 
symposiums/v025/slideslholman.ppt. For examples of specific patent lawsuits, see Bill Steele, 
Cornell Wins $184 Million Award from Hewlett-Packard for Patent Infringement, CORNELL 
CHRON. ONLINE, June 6, 2008, http://www.news.comell.edu/stories/June08/HPpatent.ws.html 
and Troy Yang, University Loses Four-Year Patent Lawsuit, STAN. DAILY, Oct. 8, 2009, available 
at http://www.stanforddaily.com/2009/10/08/university-loses-four-year-patent-lawsuit. 
53. Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 
63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 689 (2007); Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272. 
The author notes that many researchers choose to both disclose to the university and publish; 
however, publication triggers a one year statutory bar window for filing a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 
102(b) (2006). 
54. Strandburg, supra note 39, at 2248; see also Franke & Shah, supra note 39. 
55. Strandburg, supra note 39, at 2252; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008); John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where 
Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 
36 RES. POL 'y 1184, 1185-86 (2007). 
56. Walsh, Cohen & Cho, supra note 55, at 1185-86, 1189-90. 
57. See, e.g., Becky Mahurin, No Research Exception in Patent Law, MSU DISCOVERY 
NEWSL., Sept. 28, 2006, available at http://tto.montana.edu/patentscorner/pcoct98.html; Alan B. 
Bennett, Executive Dir., Univ. of Cal. Systemwide Office of Tech. Transfer & Research Admin., 
Presentation at the American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting: 
Intellectual Property and the Research Exemption: Its Impact on Science (Feb. 16, 2004), 
available at http:/lsippi.aaas.org/meetings/022004/presentations/bennett_exemption_flles/ 
v3_document.htm; Rodney L. Sparks, In-House Patent Counsel, Univ. of Va. Patent Found., 
Presentation at the Licensing Executive Society Winter Meeting (Feb. 2006), available at 
http://www.uvapf.org/live_data/documents/PatentlssuesFacingUniversities.ppt. 
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university. Faculty members follow social norms that set them apart 
from the university as a whole. Such social norms, including academic 
freedom and ignorance of patent issues, reflect the divergent goals and 
motivations that a faculty researcher and her host university hold. 
C. Implicit Legal Recognition of the Distinction between the University 
and Its Academic Researchers 
Although the discussion of an explicit view of the university 
and its academic researchers as distinct entities is a relatively novel 
one, at least two lines of legal reasoning dealing with patent law 
implicitly recognize that the university is inherently distinct from 
those conducting research within it. The application of patent law to 
determine ownership of inventions created by researchers working 
within the university and the availability of sovereign immunity as a 
defense against lawsuits for patent infringement both distinguish the 
university from the groups performing research. 
1. Patent and Invention Ownership 
Historically, patent law implicitly has recognized the 
independent structure of the university research laboratory and the 
social norms that further separate the academic researcher and the 
university. Generally, patent rights in a new technology accrue to the 
inventor.58 However, some patent rights in an invention that an 
employee created will vest in the employer if the employee was hired 
specifically to invent the widget. 59 These rules apply whether the 
employer is a private entity or a government office.60 Thus, if they are 
acting as distinct entities, academic researchers at both private and 
state universities should own any inventions created in a university 
laboratory. 
Given that university faculties have a tradition of academic 
freedom, university faculty members are not hired to invent but 
rather to engage in general research as interests evolve. Thus, a 
faculty member retains patent rights to her widget under patent 
law.61 Indeed, the same is probably true of graduate students in the 
58. See 35 U.S.C. §§ ll1, ll5 (2006). 
59. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933) (noting that an 
employer retains a "shop right" to practice a patented invention if the invention is made during 
work hours with employer materials). 
60. See Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890). Faculty at federal research 
campuses such as those of the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug 
Administration would be under the same rule. 
61. See Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1976). 
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faculty member's lab who are co-inventors.62 Furthermore, in the 
early 1900s, universities fully recognized the research autonomy of its 
faculty and allowed faculty members to patent and license inventions 
through third parties.63 The university generally did not want to be a 
part of the commercialization.64 
All of this changed in 1980 with the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act,s5 which requires that inventions developed by federally funded 
research be disclosed and assigned to the sponsoring university.66 The 
Bayh-Dole Act, together with the concomitant increase in university 
emphasis on commercialization, has meant that universities generally 
require all academic researchers' inventions to be assigned to the 
university.67 The history discussed above regarding invention within 
the university, however, indicates that the university and faculty 
traditionally viewed themselves as separate entities. 68 
2. Sovereign Immunity 
The application of sovereign immunity in university patent 
infringement cases also illustrates the distinction between the 
university and its researchers. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,69 the Supreme Court 
established that a state and its universities are immune from lawsuits 
alleging patent infringement. 70 In spite of this safety net for public 
universities, the applicability of sovereign immunity to the academic 
researchers actually conducting the infringing research is in doubt. 
62. See Simmons v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 209 P.2d 581 (Cal. 1949) (holding that a graduate 
student inventor retained rights to his invention in the absence of a contract to assign). For a 
general discussion of graduate student inventor rights, see G. Kenneth Smith, Faculty and 
Graduate Student Generated Inventions: Is University Ownership a Legal Certainty?, 1 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 4 (1997). 
63. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 50-51. 
64. Id. 
65. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)). 
66. For discussion of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on university commercialization 
and faculty relations, see infra Part III. 
67. See generally DUKE UNIV., supra note 3; HARVARD UNIV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN 
REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.otd.harvard.edu/ 
resources/policies!IPIIPPolicy.pdf; UNIV. OF CAL., PATENT POLICY (Oct. 1, 1997), available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ottlgenresources/pat-pol_97.html; UNIV/ OF MICH., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
POLICY (June 1, 2009), available at http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/resources/policies.php. 
68. WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
69. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
70. See id. 
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Without explicitly recognizing the distinction between the 
university and the academic researcher, some scholars have argued 
that the significant disconnect between the faculty researcher and the 
university may preclude the use of sovereign immunity as a viable 
defense for the infringing researcher. 71 In Kersauage u. University of 
Tennessee, one district court used just such an interpretation. 72 In 
that case, professors at the University of Tennessee, as well as the 
university itself, were sued for patent infringement. 73 The court 
dismissed the case with regard to the University of Tennessee on the 
grounds of sovereign immunity but refused to extend the defense to 
the professors. 74 The Tennessee professors might have been able to 
invoke a qualified immunity, but qualified immunity was a question of 
fact and could not be dealt with by summary judgment. 75 Therefore, 
the court made no decision regarding qualified immunity for the 
professors. 76 
The case of Riezler u. Allen has the potential to clarify this 
issue.77 In Reizler, two University of Colorado professors, Dr. Robert 
Allen and Dr. Sally Stabler, were sued in an inventorship dispute. 78 
In response, the professors asserted sovereign immunity based on 
their actions disclosing the invention to Colorado University in their 
official capacity as professors at the university79 Like the Kersauage 
court, the Riezler court did not feel that professors could invoke 
sovereign immunity and rejected the motion to dismiss. 80 Riezler and 
Kersauage illustrate that some district courts have implicitly 
recognized the distinction between the university and its faculty, 
71. Gary Pulsinelli, Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate 
Researchers at State Universities from Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82 WASH. 
L. REV. 275 (2007); Jennifer L. Owens, Note & Comment, "Not Quite Dead Yet':· The Near Fatal 
Wounding of the Experimental Use Exception and Its Impact on Public Universities, 3 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 453 (2005). 
72. Kersavage v. Univ. of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). 
73. ld. at 1328. 
7 4. Id. at 1330. 
75. Id. 
76. ld. 
77. Riezler v. Allen, No. 108CV00332, 2008 WL 5530853 (D.Colo. Sept. 2, 2008) (Motion 
to Dismiss Amended Complaint). 
78. Id. at *7. 
79. Id. at *11·13. 
80. Reizler v. Allen, No. 108CV00332, 2010 WL 1026981 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2010) (Trial 
Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit). It is possible that the professors in Riezler have a better 
case for sovereign immunity than the professors in Kersavage because of the nature of the 
activities at issue. Unlike Kersavage, the actions of the professors at issue in Riezler were not 
alleged infringing activities in the course of scientific research, but rather compliance with the 
university's disclosure policy. See id. 
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leaving faculty members open to lawsuits when the university can 
invoke immunity.sl 
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT DEMONSTRATES THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCHERS 
Sponsorships such as the BMW Endowed Chair in Systems 
Integration,82 the Halliburton Endowed Chair in Engineering,83 the 
Electronic Arts Interactive Entertainment Program, 84 the Mars, Inc. 
Endowed Chair in Developmental Nutrition, 85 and the Pfizer 
Distinguished Endowed Chair in Pharmaceutical Technology86 leave 
little doubt as to the entanglement between today's universities and 
industry.87 Add to such sponsorships the fact that, in 2007, 
universities received over 2 billion dollars in licensing revenue88 from 
vanous inventions that academic researchers created, making it 
81. Riezler is currently on appeal with the Federal Circuit. AI> this Article went to press, 
oral argument was scheduled for April 9, 2010. Calendar Announcement for the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/calendar.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2010). 
82. See Press Release, Clemson Univ., Clemson Hires Industry Leader as Fourth 
Endowed Chair for CU-ICAR Automotive Engineering Program (July 24, 2008), available at 
http://www .clemson.edu/newsroom/articles/2008/july/BMW _chair. php5. 
83. See Halliburton Foundation Endows Million-Dollar Engineering Chair at Texas 
A&M (September 29, 2009), available at http:l/engineering.tamu.edu/news/index.php/2009/09/29/ 
halliburton-foundation -endows-million -dollar-engineering-chair-at-texas-am/ (last visited Apr. 
12, 2010). 
84. See Press Release, Sch. of Cinematic Arts, Univ. of S. Cal., Tracy Fullerton Named 
EA Endowed Chair (Dec. 5, 2008), http://cinema.usc.edu/about/news/usc-school-of.htm ("In 2004, 
Electronic Arts made a multi-million dollar donation to the USC School of Cinematic Arts to 
advance interactive entertainment and create a launch pad for the next generation of game 
design .... The Electronic Arts Endowed Faculty Chair ... is one of the key catalysts that 
enables the school to fulfill the intensifying demand for talented game developers who are solidly 
grounded in visual storytelling and innovative game play."). 
85. University of California at Davis, College of Agricultural and Environmental 
Sciences, The Mars, Inc. Endowed Chair in Developmental Nutrition, 
http://caes.ucdavis.edu/giving/endowed-chairs#13 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
86. See Janice Palmer, Pfizer Endows Distinguished Chair in Pharmacy, UCONN 
ADVANCE, July 19, 2004, http://advance.uconn.edu/2004/040719/04071901.htm. 
87. Industry sponsorships may include gifts to the university or general department as a 
whole as well as money for research projects to be carried out by specific faculty members. See, 
e.g., WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 3. Note that not all such sponsorships are named for the 
sponsoring company: Harvard University's Frank Baldino, Jr. Ph.D. Professor of Sleep Medicine 
endowed chair is named for the CEO of Cephalon, the company funding the endowment. See 
Three HMS Endowed Chairs Named Simultaneously in Sleep Medicine, HARV. GAZE'ITE, May 13, 
2004, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/05.13/11-sleep.html. 
88. See AsSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING 
ACTMTY SURVEY: FY2007 138, 142 (Robert Tieckelmann et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter AUTM 
REPORT]. 
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tempting to view the modern university as just another corporate 
structure. In fact, there is growing concern over the increasing 
"corporatization" of the university,89 and many have even argued that 
universities have always been entangled with industry.90 However, 
this corporatization also illustrates the distinct motivations and goals 
of the university and its faculty scientists. 
A. History and Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act 
Many would argue that, since academia has essentially become 
a commercial enterprise, academic research should be treated as a 
commercial endeavor.91 Although some would argue that industry and 
academia were intertwined before 1980,92 many scholars point to the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act93 as the beginning of the 
industrialization of academia.94 
The Bayh-Dole Act,95 which President Carter signed into law in 
1980,96 was intended to promote the utilization of inventions arising 
from federally supported research or development. 97 To accomplish 
this goal, the Bayh-Dole Act provides a uniform system allowing non-
profit organizations such as universities to take title of inventions 
created using federal funds. 98 In order to facilitate such a transfer of 
ownership, the Bayh-Dole Act requires that the inventor assign any 
89. See WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
90. DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY· 
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2004); CHRISTOPHER NEWFIELD, IVY AND INDUSTRY: BUSINESS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 1880-1980 (2003). 
91. See WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
92. See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; NEWFIELD, supra note 90; cf id. 
(differentiating between universities that were industry focused and those dedicated to pure 
science). 
93. Bayh-Dole Act , Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)). 
94. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain 
of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); 
Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, supra note 10. 
95. Bayh-Dole Act§ 6(a). 
96. Dove Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the 
Bayh-Dole System for both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., 
MEDIA AND ENT. L. J. 311, 343 (2009). For a detailed summary of the events leading up to the 
signing of the Bayh-Dole Act, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1663 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research]. 
97. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006). 
98. See Bayh-Dole-The Next 25 Years: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and 
Innovation of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, llOth Cong. 4 (2007). 
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inventions made using federal funds to the organization with which 
the inventor is affiliated.99 Further, a university could then grant 
exclusive or non-exclusive licenses for these inventions at its 
discretion.l00 In 1983, President Reagan's executive order expanded 
this allowance to include large businesses.101 
Scholars have debated whether the Bayh-Dole Act has had the 
direct effects intended. 102 While the debate continues, universities 
clearly have increased their efforts to transfer publicly funded 
research to the private sector in the years since the Act's passage. 103 
Thus, whether or not the increased efforts are attributed to the Bayh-
Dole Act, they have clearly occurred. Since the implementation of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, the number of patents issued to universities has 
increased ten-fold.l04 While there is some debate as to whether the 
quality of those patents has also increased during this time period, the 
rate of licensing indicates that universities have rights to technologies 
that are attractive to private industry.l05 In 2007, universities 
received 17,677 invention disclosures and filed 10,899 new patent 
applications.106 Seven percent of these new inventions were licensed 
in the same year.l07 In total, universities executed 3, 784 licenses in 
2007. 108 
To accomplish this increase in technology transfer, universities 
have become more entrepreneurial themselves-in part by setting up 
technology transfer offices to coordinate patent applications, promote 
technologies, and negotiate licenses. 109 These technology transfer 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supra note 96, at 1695-96. 
102. For an overview of the debate, see Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact 
of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and 
Empirical Evidence to Date (unpublished manuscript), available at http://law.wustl.edu/CLIEG/ 
publications/mcmaniscommercializinginnovationpaper.pdf. 
103. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; see also AUTM REPORT, supra note 88. 
104. See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 9. 
105. See Tom Coupe, Science Is Golden: Academic R&D and University Patents, 28 J. 
TECH. TRANSFER 31 (2003) (arguing against increased patent quality); David C. Mowery et al., 
The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL 'y 99 (2001) (arguing for increased patent quality). 
106. AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 27, 30. 
107. Id. at 29. 
108. Id. at 38. 
109. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the 
Cost?, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007) (''There were only twenty-five active technology-
transfer offices in the United States at the time the Bayh-Dole Act was passed. By the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the Act, there were 3300."). For an overview of the literature regarding 
university entrepreneurship, see Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, supra note 10. 
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offices, which are involved in the more traditional patenting and 
licensing aspects of technology transfer, 110 have become a source of 
revenue for many universities.m However, other university-
sponsored organizations are also involved m the actual 
commercialization of technologies. For example, many universities 
help start up new companies by registering trademarks, filing 
incorporation documents, and providing referrals and incubator 
space. 112 A few even provide equity funding for new companies.113 
This pressure to become entrepreneurial extends to the faculty 
as well. Many economics scholars encourage scientific faculty to be 
more entrepreneurial114 and have developed techniques to help them 
do so.l15 Of particular interest are programs within the university 
that encourage researchers to consider commercial aspects of research 
during very early stage research. For example, participants in the 
Technological Innovation: Generating Economic Results (TI:G ER) 
Program, a joint collaboration between the Georgia Tech College of 
Management and Emory Law School, form teams consisting of law 
school and business school students, along with a graduate student in 
the sciences, to determine the commercial possibilities of the graduate 
student's research.l 16 The University of Virginia Patent Foundation 
hosts graduate student interns to encourage students to learn about 
technology transfer and intellectual property rights.l 17 Other 
universities use their technology transfer offices to encourage faculty 
entrepreneurship. For example, the University of Virginia Patent 
Foundation recognizes several Inventors of the Year to encourage 
110. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang eta!., supra note 10. 
111. Dreyfuss, supra note 94; cf WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 169-71 (arguing that only 
fifty percent of technology transfer offices break even). 
112. The University of Virginia has created the for-profit group SpinnerTech to provide 
assistance. See Spinner Technologies Inc., http://www.spinnertechnologies.com/ (last visited Mar. 
23, 2010). Washington University has joined resources with local universities and other nonprofit 
and for-profit entities to form a research district with laboratory space for the St. Louis area. See 
Cortex, http://www.cortexstl.com/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
113. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, supra note 10. 
114. See, e.g., Anthony A. del Campo et a!., The Transfer and Commercialization of 
University-Developed Medical Imaging Technology: Opportunities and Problems, 46 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 289 (1999); Henry Etzkowitz et a!., The Future of the 
University and the University of the Future: Evolution of Ivory Tower to Entrepreneurial 
Paradigm, 26 RES. POL 'y 313 (2000); Trevor Grigg, Adopting an Entrepreneurial Approach in 
Universities, 11 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 273 (1994). 
115. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272. 
116. See Emory University School of Law, TI:GER, http://www.law.emory.edu/academics/ 
academic-programs/tiger.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Georgia Tech College of Management, 
TI:GER, http://tiger.gatech.edu/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
117. University of Virginia Patent Foundation, Graduate Student Internships, 
http://www.uvapf.org/internships (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
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disclosure of inventions. 118 Additionally, technology transfer offices 
often hold open houses or conduct presentations for the faculty to 
familiarize the faculty with the offerings of the office.l19 
This increased emphasis on technology transfer has also led to 
a close university-industry relationship. The biggest benefit for 
universities in this relationship is funding. 120 As per capita state and 
federal funding for universities has decreased in recent years, 121 
universities have used industry dollars to update facilities and 
increase budgets. 122 Additionally, industry has begun to sponsor 
specific endowed chairs within university departments.123 Research 
funding from industry has also increased during this time period from 
2.1 billion dollars in 1998 to 3.4 billion dollars in 2007 for much the 
same reason; however, industry funding has remained a relatively 
constant percentage of overall research funding during the same time 
period, varying only between seven and ten percent of overall research 
funding. 124 Many have argued that the increased commercialization 
and closer industrial relationships conflict with the public's interest in 
research that tax dollars also help to fund.125 
Some scholars have argued that this academic-industry 
relationship diverts universities from their traditional mission126 
because the resulting "multiversity'' no longer has its focus on open 
public science.l27 Others debate whether there has ever been such a 
unity of mission. The history of "pure research" institutions born in 
118. See Press Release, Univ. ofVa. Patent Found., UVAPF Honors 2009 Inventors of the 
Year (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uvapf.org/live_datallive_site_page.php?page_id= 
23&article_id=29. 
119. See, e.g., University of Michigan Tech Transfer, U-M Tech Transfer Open House, 
http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/news_events/success_stories/story_52.php (last visited Mar. 
23, 2010); Washington University in St. Louis, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research, 
Technology Commercialization Seminar Series, http://research.wustl.edu/events/Pages/ 
EventDetails.aspx?EventiD=294 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
120. Yong S. Lee, The Sustainability of University-Industry Research Collaboration: An 
Empirical Assessment, 25 J. TECH. TRANSFER ll1, 121 (2000). 
121. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 8. 
122. See id. at 5, 7 ("[B]uildings increasingly bore the names of corporate donors"). 
123. See id. ("[E]ven academic titles were changing, with Laura D'Andrea Tyson ... 
known as the BankAmerica Dean of the Haas School of Business."); see, e.g., the Kmart chair of 
Marketing at Wayne State University and the examples discussed supra Part III. 
124. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 23. 
125. Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual 
Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POL 'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 255-56, 273 (1998) (noting that 
increased commercialization may lead to a corrosion of the mission of research universities, 
undercutting public trust in these institutions). 
126. Id. at 257. 
127. Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at 
American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 17-18 (2001). 
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1800s Germany and giving rise to graduate education in the United 
States in 1876 at Johns Hopkins University can be juxtaposed against 
the numerous universities that have a long history of working with 
industry.128 For example, the University of North Carolina and the 
University of Kentucky have long had ties to the tobacco industry, 
while the University of Minnesota historically developed iron ore 
processing methods for the mining industry. 129 Additionally, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has long been a general friend 
to industry.l30 Others argue that, even with such alliances, 
universities were not merely suppliers of innovation to industry but 
also havens of "non-utilitarian knowledge and research driven by pure 
curiosity."131 
Regardless of the history of the university mission, current 
industry sponsorships raise concerns over who controls hiring and 
university spending. 132 It is unclear to what extent sponsoring 
corporations influence how "gifts" are used. Industry research funding 
and partnerships are also fraught with dangers to the independence of 
scientific researchers. Confidentiality agreements133 between 
researchers and industry sponsors and publication control by industry 
sponsors threaten the free flow of information that should be an 
academic norm. 134 
In spite of the intellectual successes shown by the 2007 patent 
and licensing statistics, 135 some argue that the Bayh-Dole Act has not 
had the impact that many had hoped. These critics have argued that 
industry and academia have always been interconnected to a certain 
degree, 136 and that, because the relationship has always existed, the 
increased licensing and technology transfer could have happened 
without passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.137 Therefore, these scholars 
argue that the impetus for the increased technology transfer is the 
natural progression of research to a stage where useful commercial 
results can be visualized.138 Additionally, they argue, the increased 
spending by industry has actually remained a relatively constant 7 
128. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 33; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90. 
129. WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
130. Id. 
131. NEWFIELD, supra note 90, at 16-17. 
132. Id. at 6-7. 
133. Jd_ at 74. 
134. Jd_ at 20-22, 108-18. 
135. AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 32, 37. 
136. See NEWFIELD, supra note 90; WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
137. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90, at L 
138. Id. at 1-2. 
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percent of the total research funding139 over a period of years that has 
seen the total number of researchers explode. 140 Others argue that the 
Bayh-Dole Act has had-at most-indirect effects. One study found 
that the true impetus for increased licensing is the establishment of a 
technology transfer office with a number of full time employees in the 
office. 141 If these data are correct, the Bayh-Dole Act certainly would 
be a strong, albeit indirect, impetus for the technology transfer 
explosion because the Act is the cause of the massive creation of 
technology transfer offices. 142 
Some studies go so far as to say that technology transfer offices 
on the whole are not successful, even in light of the statistics related 
to the large amount of university licensing. 143 Of the 141 universities 
granting licenses in 1999 and 2000, 80 percent of the income went to 
twenty-two universities, and 45 percent of the income went to only five 
universities. 144 In 2002, two-thirds of the revenue went to licenses 
from just thirteen universities. 145 By 2007, 49 percent of the gross 
license revenues went to just three universities. 146 In fact, one study 
estimated that 50 percent of technology transfer offices do not break 
even. 147 
Additionally, one argument in favor of the Bayh-Dole Act is the 
need to give industry exclusive control over intellectual property 
rights in order to incentivize commercialization.l48 However, in 2007, 
only 43 percent of the outgoing licenses that universities executed 
were exclusive.149 Finally, in spite of the focus on research and 
technology transfer, university patents are still a relatively small 
percentage of total patents. Between 1969 and 2005, universities 
were issued 48,612 patents150 out of the 3.8 million utility patents and 
139. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 23. 
140. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, AGE DATA ON NIH PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS: 1970-2006, 
available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/new_investigators/nih_age_data_principal_ 
investigators_1970-2006.xls. 
141. Coupe, supra note 105, at 42 (2003). 
142. Id. at 43. 
143. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 37. 
144. Bayh-Dole-The Next 25 Years, supra note 98, at 4. 
145. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 169. 
146. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 139-42. 
147. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 169-71. 
148. Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supra note 96, at 1672. 
149. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 38. 
150. PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, ELEC. INFO. PRODS. DIV., U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR 
YEARS 1969-2005 (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/goltaf/univ/org_filall_univ_af.htm. For an 
explanation of the data presented, see PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, ELEC. INFO. PRODS. 
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290,000 non-utility patents that were issued during that time 
period, 151 making up only 1.2 percent of the total patents issued. 
B. Lessons from the Bayh-Dole Act 
Whether or not one believes in the success of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, the statistics regarding university patents152 seem to paint a 
highly industrialized picture of universities and industry working 
together as one unit to commercialize innovations made by academic 
researchers. However, a closer investigation reveals that the effects of 
the Bayh-Dole Act highlight the breach between a university and its 
faculty and other academic researchers. Although the Bayh-Dole Act 
seems to directly or indirectly have had an effect on the transfer of 
technology disclosed to the university, its effect on the faculty is 
generally less pervasive. 
If the Bayh-Dole Act impacted the faculty in the same way as 
the university, one would expect to see the commercialization of 
research become a major focus of academic researchers. This focus 
would likely result in a concomitant shift to applied research for easier 
commercialization. However, the increased licensing and industry 
funding seem to have had little effect on the overall type of research 
being performed. 153 One external study of a twenty-five million dollar 
funding deal between Novartis and the University of California 
Berkeley revealed that the influx of money from industry did not 
divert the focus of laboratories that were previously conducting basic 
research. 154 Additionally, faculties generally remain resistant to 
commercialization attempts. One study suggests that faculty 
disclosed less than 50 percent of inventions with commercial potential 
to the university. 155 Most academic researchers declining to disclose 
inventions did so because they did not want to take time away from 
their research 156 or pursue further commercial development. 157 Such 
DIV., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT 
GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969-2005: EXPLANATION OF DATA, http://www.uspto.gov/go/tafluniv/ 
org_gr/explan.htm. 
151. PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, ELEC. INFO. PRODS. DIV., U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR 
YEARS 1969-2005: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORT, http://www.uspto.gov/go/stats/univ/ 
doc/doc_info_2005.htm. 
152. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 107-80. 
153. Mowery et al., supra note 105, at 100. 
154. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 4. 
155. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272. 
156. Id. Researchers must also f:tll out various disclosure forms for the university as well 
as assist the technology transfer offices during patent prosecution. 
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an attitude reveals that an academic researcher views her time and 
research to be such a personal, rather than institutional, investment 
that she will ignore federal and institutional mandates to disclose new 
inventions. 
This seeming contradiction between the effects of the Bayh-
Dole Act on the university and its faculty is better understood in light 
of the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act-to promote transfer of technology 
by the university rather than to incentivize innovation by the 
faculty.l 58 Although the Bayh-Dole Act requires universities to share 
proceeds from commercialization of the inventor's technology with the 
faculty inventor, 159 there is some reason to doubt that receiving this 
revenue is a true incentive for academic researchers to disclose the 
technology to the university.l60 The idea that monetary incentives 
promotEl university interest in technology transfer but not researcher 
interest illustrates the misalignment of interests and incentives 
between university administration and the faculty. When trying to 
commercialize a technology, technology transfer offices have to 
balance the interests of the university and the faculty161 because the 
two groups have very different perspectives on commercialization. 162 
While the university is highly incentivized by the money that it would 
receive in exchange for the transfer of technology, the average faculty 
member is more concerned with the research itself than with 
commercializing it. For example, Tom Doetschman, a scientist at the 
University of Arizona, 163 has created over 120 strains of transgenic 
mice, all of which are freely available to other researchers, indicating 
his priority for the free flow of research materials. 164 Additionally, as 
noted above, many faculty members choose not to pursue patenting 
because of the fear that it will take time away from research.l65 
Often, faculty members, rather than the university, perceive a 
threat from industry to academic independence and public duty. In 
UNIVERSITY, INC., Jennifer Washburn, in proposing that the 
157. Id. It is estimated that seventy-one percent of the technology licensed from a 
university requires further development before commercialization. Id. 
158. Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supra note 96, at 1691-92. 
159. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(b) (2006). 
160. See the discussion regarding the incentives of academic researchers infra Part V. 
161. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272-73. 
162. Id. at 1273; see also Donald S. Siegel et al., Commercial Knowledge Transfers from 
Universities to Firms: Improving the Effectiveness of University-Industry Collaboration, 14 J. 
HIGH TECH. MGMT. RES. 111, 115-16 (2003). 
163. See University of Arizona, Laboratory of Tom Doetschman, 
http://www.mcrp.med.arizona.edu/html/tomdoetschman/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
164. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 154. 
165. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272. 
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university has become nothing more than a new corporate form due to 
its relationship with industry, inadvertently provides evidence of the 
distinction between the university and its academic researchers.166 
Although it is not her purpose, the book describes numerous examples 
that can be re-interpreted to support an argument for divergent views 
of the university and its faculty. 167 Mter the twenty-five million dollar 
deal between the University of California Berkeley and Novartis,168 for 
example, only 41 percent of the faculty supported the alliance, while 
50 percent were afraid that the industry funding would have a 
negative effect on research at Berkeley.l69 Additionally, because of 
faculty and student pressure on the university, internal and external 
groups monitored the impact of the deal on Berkeley research.l7° Yale 
University became a target of protests by faculty, postdoctoral fellows, 
students, and other researchers when it claimed to be unable to help 
Mrican AIDS organizations due to exclusive licenses of its patented 
HIV drugs to Bristol Myers Squibb.l71 Finally, the university's focus 
on proprietary licenses with opportunities to monetize the technology 
often brings it into conflict with academic researchers. For instance, 
faculty members in computer science departments often push for open 
source licenses for software rather than proprietary licenses, 172 and a 
large percentage of knowledge and technology from academia is 
transferred through publication and other informal methods which 
may preclude any monetization of the technology. 
Discussions of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act clearly show 
that there is a distinction between the attitude and motivations of the 
university and those of its academic researchers. As a result, there is 
often a disconnect between the actions of the two parties, resulting in 
virulent and public disagreements between the university and its 
faculty, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other 
researchers and staff.l73 
166. See WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
167. See id. 
168. Id. at 3-4. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 164-67. 
172. I d. at 159. 
173. See the text accompanying footnotes 168-172 for descriptions of the results of 
universities and faculty disagreements. 
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Ill. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS ACADEMIC 
RESEARCHERS REVITALIZES THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION 
The patent system was established to incentivize invention by 
granting exclusive rights to the patented invention during the life of 
the patent.l74 However, until recently, there generally was a 
recognition that patents and patent infringement deal with 
commercial applications rather than with research or uses for the 
public good.175 This concept resulted in a number of exceptions to the 
general rules, including a research exception to the statutory bar, 176 
march-in rights, 177 and the experimental use exception, a common law 
exception to patent infringement established in the early nineteenth-
century.178 In its original formulation, the experimental use exception 
provided a haven from patent infringement for people who used a 
patented invention for philosophical inquiry or for determining if the 
invention worked as disclosed.l79 Courts have reinterpreted the 
experimental use exception many times since its inception, but in the 
past it was generally thought to apply to educational institutions.180 
In the past decade, the Federal Circuit has substantially 
narrowed the experimental use exception. In Madey v. Duke 
University, 1B1 a former Duke University professor brought a patent 
infringement claim against the university during an ownership 
contest regarding multiple pieces of laboratory equipment. 182 Duke 
defended the patent claim using the experimental use exception, but 
the Federal Circuit held the doctrine inapplicable to Duke because 
Duke had a "legitimate business interest" in using the patent. 183 As a 
result, many scholars have declared that the experimental use 
exception is no longer available to academic scientists. However, 
recognizing that Madey applies to the university as an institution 
should still allow academic researchers to continue to use the 
exception under certain circumstances. 
174. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
175. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 
F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1965)). 
176. Controlled research necessary to develop an invention does not put the invention 
into public use. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1878). 
177. The government retains "march-in" rights to practice any patented inventions 
created with federal funding in certain circumstances. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). 
178. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
179. ld. 
180. See infra Part II.A. 
181. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
182. ld. at 1352. 
183. ld. at 1362. 
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A. History of Experimental Use Exception 
The concept of patent law was considered important enough to 
be authorized in the United States Constitution. 184 Patents confer to 
inventors the exclusive rights to exclude others from practicing their 
inventions for limited periods of time185 in order to incentivize the 
production of new inventions.186 Because of the exclusive nature of the 
rights, the patent holder can sue for infringement another person who 
uses the invention without a license before the patent expiration 
date. 187 However, the authors of the Constitution believed that 
patents were a trade-off to benefit society. Thomas Jefferson called 
them an "embarrassment" to be used only when necessary for the 
public good.188 Therefore, it should not be surprising that, throughout 
much of U.S. history, patents have not been enforced against 
infringers when the infringement is deemed to be for the public good. 
For example, the government retains march-in rights to inventions 
created with government funds so that the public is never denied the 
use of a publicly funded invention due to patent infringement. 189 
Similarly, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drugs companies to 
use patented drugs under certain circumstances so as not to extend 
artificially the exclusive rights of a patent holder due to Food and 
Drug Administration approval issues. 19° Finally, patent rights initially 
were not believed to be so strong as to inhibit experimentation and 
tinkering. 191 
Since the early nineteenth-century, patent rights have been 
interpreted to include an exception to infringement when the 
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (''The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
185. 35 u.s.c. § 101 (2006). 
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
187. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
188. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 
1905), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
("Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of 
society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the 
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.") 
189. 35 u.s.c. § 203 (2006). 
190. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). If generic companies were unable to use patented drugs 
for studies to submit to the FDA, the name brand drugs would enjoy a de facto patent extension 
while the generic companies completed studies required for FDA approval of sales after patent 
expiration. 
191. See text accompanying footnotes 192·222. 
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invention is used for experimental purposes. 192 This experimental use 
exception is a common law doctrine whose origins can be traced back 
to the 1813 case of Whittemore u. Cutter.l93 In Whittemore, Justice 
Story established experimental use as a defense to patent 
infringement194 when the infringement occurred during the process of 
scientific research. 195 Recognizing that the Founding Fathers had not 
intended patents to preclude scientific research, Justice Story wrote 
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to 
punish a man who [used a patented invention] . . . merely for 
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency ... to produce its desired effects."196 Justice Story went on 
to further define the experimental use exception as applying to uses of 
the invention in which the invention was not made for commercial 
gain. 197 This not-for-profit standard was developed in the case law 
and remained the test for over 150 years.198 During this time, 
experimental use of a patented invention to improve the invention and 
procure an improvement patent was not considered to be a for-profit 
use.l99 
The experimental use exception began evolving once again in 
the late 1970s as courts began to consider the commercial interests of 
the patent user. In Pitcairn u. United States,200 manufacturers used 
patented technologies to build and test helicopters for the 
government.201 The Pitcairn court rejected the argument that use of 
the patented technology for testing or evaluation of the helicopters fell 
under the experimental use exception. 202 The Pitcairn court instead 
held that the infringing tests were required to prepare the helicopters 
192. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
193. Id. at 1120. 
194. Interestingly, Justice Story also set forth the fair use exception in copyright law. See 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
195. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121. 
196. Id. 
197. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 12,391). 
198. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (holding 
that a non-infringing technology "procured by the defendant was used only for testing and for 
experimental purposes"); Dugan v. Lear A via, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding 
that a defendant's action did not constitute infringement where the "defendant built that device 
only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale nor sold any"); Bonsach 
Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896) ("[I]f an infringing machine is made 
or used as an experiment merely, it does not infringe former patents."). 
199. Chesterfield, 159 F. Supp. at 375. 
200. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
201. Id. at 1125-26. 
202. Id. 
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for sale, and as such, the experimental use exception was not 
available. 203 
Subsequent decisions from the Federal Circuit have further 
narrowed the application of the experimental use exception to the 
point of near extinction. In Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical 
Co., a generic drug manufacturer used a patented drug to perform 
experiments for submission to the Food and Drug Administration once 
the patents had expired.204 The court held that the use of the 
patented drug was infringing, saying that infringing activity "in the 
guise of 'scientific inquiry' when that inquiry has definite cognizable, 
and not insubstantial commerce prospects" is not an experimental 
use. 205 The majority later used the Roche standard in Embrex, Inc. v. 
Service Engineering Corp. 206 to hold that testing for a commercial 
purpose is infringing, even if commercialization later proves 
unsuccessful.2°7 Judge Rader's concurrence in Embrex went even 
further, saying that the Patent Act disallows the experimental use 
exception entirely.2os 
The Embrex concurrence significantly impacted the court, 
which further limited the experimental use exception in Madey v. 
Duke University. 209 John Madey, a former Duke University professor, 
sued Duke over possession of a Free Electron Laser (FEL) and a 
Microwave Gun Test Stand (Test Gun). 210 Professor Madey had 
brought the FEL with him from Stanford University, and personally 
owned patents surrounding the FEL and Test Gun.211 Duke, however, 
had invested in a new facility to house the FEL212 and its associated 
laboratory space as well as aiding North Carolina Central University 
(NCCU) in building the Test Gun in Duke's facility. 213 Unfortunately, 
ownership of the FEL and Test Gun was not addressed in the 
employment agreement between Professor Madey and Duke. 214 In the 
course of trying to get the equipment transferred to his new 
laboratory, Professor Madey alleged patent infringement by Duke 
203. Id. 
204. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
205. Id. at 863. 
206. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F. 3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
207. Id. at 1349. 
208. Id. at 1352. 
209. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
210. Id. at 1352. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Madey v. Duke, 266 F.Supp.2d 420, 421-422 (M.D.N.C.,2001) 
214. Id. (indicating the elements contained in the agreement between Madey and Duke). 
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University.215 Duke seemed to concede that both the Test Gun and 
FEL read on the claims of Madey's patents216 because Duke based its 
defense for infringement of the FEL patent on the experimental use 
exception using Duke's non-profit status and its defense for 
infringement of the Test Gun on the fact that the Test Gun had been 
used solely by researchers from NCCU after Madey's departure.217 
Based upon the district court's determinations that no Duke 
researchers had used the Test Gun after Madey's departure, the 
NCCU researcher was not an agent of Duke, and Duke had no control 
over the Test Gun, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's 
dismissal of Madey's patent infringement claim relating to Duke's 
"use" of the Test Gun Patent. 218 The Federal Circuit then addressed 
Duke's infringement of the patents relating to the FEL and the 
availability of the experimental use exception. Relying on Roche219 
and Judge Rader's concurrence in Embrex,220 the court held that the 
non-profit or commercial status of an accused infringer did not matter 
as long as the infringing activity furthered a legitimate business 
interest.221 According to the Madey court, Duke University had a 
legitimate business interest in educating students and faculty. 222 The 
court also pointed out that Duke University funded research projects 
to increase the status of the university by luring grants, faculty, and 
students, thus furthering its business interest.223 Finally, in a 
footnote, the court noted that Duke pursued an aggressive licensing 
policy, receiving a "not insubstantial revenue stream."224 In so 
holding, the Madey court laid down a two-prong test for whether an 
act of infringement qualifies for the experimental use exception. The 
infringing act (1) must be solely for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, and (2) must not be 
performed in furtherance of the infringer's legitimate business 
interest. 225 
215. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1353. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 1362. 
218. Id. at 1363. The Federal Circuit seems to hint that Duke might be subject to 
vicarious or contributory infringement, but Madey failed to argue this cause of action. ld. 
219. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
220. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., 
concurring) (concluding that ''the slightest commercial implication" disallows the experimental 
use exception). 
221. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1362 n.7. 
225. Id. at 1362. 
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B. Current Interpretation of Madey 
Reaction to Madey has been mixed. Many scholars initially 
proclaimed that Madey would be the death knell of academic 
research,226 but others have noted that companies are loath to sue 
universities for infringement, resulting in an informal experimental 
use exception.227 This informal experimental use exception has led 
many to theorize that no further discussion is warranted. 228 Other 
scholars prefer not to rely on the restraint of companies for the 
continuation of the experimental use exception. 229 On the other hand, 
many scholars argue that a formal experimental use exception is a bad 
idea, and point out the increased commercialization and 
industrialization of academia as the reasons why.230 Regardless of 
their views regarding the necessity of an experimental use exception, 
most scholars agree that the formal experimental use exception is 
dead for researchers at universities.231 
C. New Interpretation of Madey 
Little scholarship exists defining how the Madey two-part test 
should be applied. Scholars seem uninterested in defining what the 
court meant by "legitimate business interests."232 Indeed, most 
scholars have assumed that the experimental use exception is 
226. See Dreyfuss, supra note 94; Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use 
Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and 
Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Joseph Mohr, Comment, 
Unshackle Academia and Allow It to Exemplify the Purpose of Patent Law: 'To Promote the 
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts", 88 MARQ. L. REV. 671 (2004). 
227. See, e.g., Richard J. Bauer, Comment, Why Not Try the Experiment and Stop 
Pointing the Finger? Modern University Research Unaffected by a Narrow Experimental Use 
Exception, 24 TEMP. J. Scr. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 121 (2005); Cristina Weschler, Note, The Informal 
Experimental Use Exception: University Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1536 (2004). 
228. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do 
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HAsTINGS L.J. 921 (2006); Bauer, supra note 227; 
Weschler, supra note 227. 
229. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1097 (2008) [hereinafter 
Eisenberg, Anticommons]. 
230. See, e.g., Weschler, supra note 227. 
231. Most scholars focus on calls for legislative reform or how the experimental use 
exception should be applied if it is reinstated. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the 
Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wrs. L. REV. 81 (2004); Michelle 
Cai, Note, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities' Experimental Use 
Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2004). 
232. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
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inapplicable to any research conducted within a university setting. 233 
What scholars have not recognized is that the Federal Circuit's 
holding in Madey only applies to infringement by a university as an 
institution. Based on the argument that the university and its 
academic researchers function as distinct entities234 and Madey's 
application to institutional infringement,235 this Article argues that 
academic researchers may invoke the experimental use exception 
under certain circumstances. 
This Article posits that the Madey experimental use exception 
analysis was based on decisions and actions of Duke University that 
were made as a matter of institutional policy rather than the actions 
of any of its individual faculty members. Duke University withheld 
the FEL and Test Gun from Professor Madey during an ownership 
dispute.236 Professor Madey claimed that Duke University directly 
infringed his Test Gun patent by making the Test Gun available to 
researchers from North Carolina Central University (NCCU);237 
however, neither the NCCU researchers nor NCCU were named as 
parties to the lawsuit.238 The Federal Circuit held that Duke did not 
directly infringe Madey's Test Gun patent because the direct infringer, 
NCCU, was not an agent of the university and Duke had no direct 
control over the Test Gun. 239 Thus, although the Test Gun was 
located at Duke, Duke's lack of control over the researchers or the Test 
Gun resulted in a lack of infringement. Similarly, in the case of the 
FEL infringement, no Duke University researchers were named as 
parties to the lawsuit. 240 However, since Duke effectively conceded 
233. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 229; Rowe, supra note 228; Tom 
Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental 
Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261 (2003); Cai, supra note 231; Andrew J. Caruso, Comment, The 
Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's View, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 215 (2003); 
Kevin Sandstrom, Note, How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the 
Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light of Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. 
Merck KGaA, 331 F. 3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1059 (2004); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, SCI., Feb. 14, 2003, at 1018-19. 
234. See supra Part II. 
235. See supra Part IV.A. 
236. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352. 
237. Id. at 1353 (noting that the Test Gun Stand was owned by NCUU but housed by 
Duke University). The court specifically mentions that Professor Madey made no claim of 
vicarious or contributory infringement. Id. at 1363. 
238. Id. at 1351. NCCU researchers were probably not included because this suit grew 
out of a dispute over possession of the FEL by Duke University. 
239. Id. at 1357. 
240. Several people were initially included in the lawsuit in their official capacities as 
administrators of the university. See Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97CV01170, 1998 WL 
35259797 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1998) (First Amended and Supplemental Complaint) (naming as co-
defendants: Charles E. Putman, Senior Vice President, Research Administration Policy of Duke 
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direct infringement of the FEL patent absent the experimental use 
exception,241 the court had no reason to determine if research 
performed by Duke's faculty members would give rise to direct 
liability. Thus, the Madey decision reflects an analysis of the business 
interests of Duke as an institution.242 
An analysis in light of infringement by a faculty researcher 
within a university should be different from that in Madey. As 
discussed in Parts I and II above, faculty researchers are largely 
autonomous from the university and have different motivations than 
the institution.243 Therefore, infringement by faculty researchers 
should be analyzed independently from infringement by the university 
as an institution. While Madey analyzed the test for use of the 
experimental use exception in the context of the university as an 
institution, the definition of a "legitimate business interest" in the 
context of a faculty researcher is still unclear. 
D. Application of Madey to Academic Researchers 
If, as suggested, the academic researcher and the university 
are operating as distinct entities and have different goals and 
incentives,244 then the Madey court's determination that universities 
have business interests at stake in patent infringement does not 
automatically mean that university faculty and researchers have the 
same business interests. Therefore, to invoke the experimental use 
exception, academic scientists' research must be analyzed to 
determine if it complies with the two-part test in Madey. 245 The 
Madey court held that for a scientist using a patented invention to 
invoke the experimental use exception, the scientist must (1) be using 
the invention "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
University; John Strohbehn, Provost of Duke University; William H. Chafe, Dean of the Faculty 
of Arts & Sciences of Duke University; Berndt Mueller, Chairman of the Department of Physics 
of Duke University; Bobby Guenther, Interim Director of the Duke FEL Laboratory, and 
Lawrence Evans, former Chairman of the Department of Physics). 
241. By defending solely with the experimental use defense, Duke effectively conceded 
that, absent the defense, it had infringed Madey's patents. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 
1351, 1353 (M.D.N.C. 2001) ("Duke seems to concede that the alleged infringing devices and 
methods read on the claims of the patents."). 
242. It is unclear that a defense based on lack of control of the FEL and Duke researchers 
would have worked in this case because Duke seemed to have very tight control over the FEL 
laboratory. 
243. See supra Parts II & III. 
244. 
245. 
See supra Part II. 
See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
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philosophical inquiry,"246 and (2) not further a "legitimate business 
interest" of the infringing party.247 Thus, academic researchers are 
left to determine if their research is philosophical inquiry and whether 
it furthers a legitimate business interest. 
1. Scientific Research as a Form of Philosophical Inquiry 
The first requirement that the actions be performed "for ... 
strictly philosophical inquiry"248 is derived from the original wording 
of the common law exception.249 By stating that it "could never have 
been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who constructed 
such a machine merely for philosophical experiments," Justice Story 
created the experimental use exception to protect scientific 
research. 250 Such a perception of science as philosophy is consistent 
with the fact that authors have used various terms to refer to 
scientific research in our historical writings. The Constitution directs 
Congress to "promote science and the useful arts."251 Immediately, the 
change in nomenclature becomes apparent as Congress derives its 
copyright powers from the term "science" and its patent powers from 
the term "useful arts."252 Therefore, even the precise wording in the 
Constitution is different from our usage today. When Justice Story 
referred to philosophical experiments, he was using "philosophy" to 
mean pure science and possibly engineering. 253 This is evident not 
only from the context of the case254 but also from the historical use of 
the term "philosophy." Judge Newman, in her Integra dissent, 
describes the historical origins of science as natural philosophy. 255 
This connection between science and philosophy has been very strong 
and well recognized.256 Even in today's world where science is thought 
246. 
2000)). 
247. 
248. 
249. 
250. 
Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
Id. at 1362. 
Embrex, 216 F.2d at 1349. 
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
I d. 
251. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
252. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U. S. 
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 50-51 (1949). 
253. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121. 
254. Id. at 1120-22. 
255. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (describing the historical origins of science as natural philosophy). 
256. Will Durant stated the relationship elegantly: ''The relation of science to philosophy 
needs no further clarification: the sciences are the windows through which philosophy sees the 
world, they are the senses of which it is the soul; without it their knowledge is as chaotically 
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of as objective, there is a realization that "fundamentals of a scientific 
understanding [are] not a static unchanging set of natural laws, 
rather these paradigms [are] human interpretations of phenomena as 
much dependant on the community in which they surfaced as on the 
nature of reality herself."257 
Courts have recognized that there are experimental uses that, 
while scientific, do go beyond philosophical inquiry. For example, the 
Federal Circuit referred to these uses in Roche when it spoke of 
experimental use that was in the "guise of scientific inquiry."258 A 
review of patent cases reveals that scientific philosophy is often 
contrasted with commercial research. With respect to when a patent 
should be granted, the Supreme Court noted that the "patent system 
must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of 
philosophy."259 Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Roche held that the 
experimental use exception would not apply because Bolar's use had 
"definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes."260 
It is these extensions of philosophical inquiry that give rise to the 
question of a legitimate business interest in Madey. 
2. The Legitimate Business Interest of Academic Researchers 
Once an alleged act of infringement is determined to be a form 
of philosophical inquiry, the question becomes whether the 
infringement furthers a legitimate business interest of the user. 
While the idea of philosophical inquiry is relatively straightforward, 
the definition of a "legitimate business interest" is unclear and 
depends on the identity of the entity infringing on the patent. 
Unfortunately, the Madey court muddied the waters by broadening 
the definition of a business interest to include interests related to non-
commercial entities261 without specifically defining what such a 
business interest could be. Instead, Judge Rader merely referred to 
"any reasonable interpretation of Duke's legitimate business 
interest."262 It may be that Judge Rader used the "I know it when I 
helpless as sensations that come to a disordered mind, making an idiot's lore." WILL DURANT, 
THE PLEASURES OF PHILOSOPHY: A SURVEY OF HUMAN LIFE AND DESTINY 7 (1953). 
257. Philosophy of Science, by Roger Jones, http://www.philosopher.org.uk/sci.htm (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
258. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
259. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 
970 (C.C.P.A. 1965)). 
260. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863. 
261. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F. 3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
262. Id. 
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see it"263 standard of defining a legitimate business interest. However, 
it seems reasonable that lower courts and scientists might need more 
guidance. 
Therefore, the first step in determining whether an academic 
researcher can use the experimental use exception should be to 
determine exactly what the business interests of the academic 
researcher are. The Federal Circuit has been very clear that any 
commercial use is a legitimate business interest of the alleged 
infringer.264 Experiments that have "definite cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes"265 or the "slightest commercial 
implications"266 are only in the "guise" of philosophical inquiry267 and 
are a legitimate business interest. Defining the business interest of a 
non-commercial entity is much less clear. In Madey, the Federal 
Circuit declared that Duke University had specific business objectives. 
Those objectives included educating students and faculty, 268 obtaining 
research grants, and sanctioning research projects in order to increase 
its reputation.269 Additionally, the court pointed to the "aggressive 
patent licensing program" as a source of revenue and, presumably, a 
commercial interest. 270 
However, since the university and the academic researcher 
have been shown to be acting as distinct entities for purposes of 
scientific research and to have very different goals and incentives, the 
business objectives of the university are very different from the 
business objective of the academic researcher. Therefore, the question 
of how to define the business objective of the academic researcher 
remains. 
This author posits that most academic researchers in the 
laboratory are focused solely on conducting scientific research. Put 
another way, the business of most academic researchers is 
philosophical inquiry.271 This stands in contrast to that of the 
university, which does not, as an institution, conduct research. 
263. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declining to 
define hard-core pornography). 
264. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
265. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863. 
266. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
267. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863. 
268. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1356. 
269. ld. at 1362. 
270. Id. 
271. The author acknowledges that some academic research is conducted for reasons 
other than philosophical inquiry. However, the framework for determining whether the academic 
research at issue is conducted for philosophical inquiry (and thus whether it is eligible for the 
experimental use exception) is complex and beyond the scope of this article. 
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Instead, it receives money and prestige, and owes its existence as a 
research institution to the philosophical inquiry of others.272 Activities 
conducted to further philosophical inquiry, when that inquiry is the 
sole business of the researcher, should not be considered to be 
"furthering a business objective" for the purposes of disallowing the 
experimental use exception. If such activities were considered to 
further a business objective, this interpretation would define the 
experimental use exception out of existence. In a time period where 
almost all philosophical inquiry requires massive inputs of equipment 
and reagents which are borne by the federal government and other 
granting agencies, almost all research is conducted in institutional 
contexts rather than basements or garages. 
In whatever manner the ''business objective" of a given 
academic researcher is defined, it is this definition that should guide 
the analysis of whether the experimental use exception defense is 
appropriate. The distinct nature of the role of the academic 
researcher within the university indicates that an academic 
researcher is acting on her own behalf when conducting infringing 
activities. 
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS ACADEMIC 
RESEARCHERS REVEALS THE ENTREPRENEURIAL NATURE OF FACULTY 
Scholars have spent much time lamenting the lack of 
entrepreneurial drive of faculty members and devising the best way to 
get university faculty to accept and internalize the goal of transferring 
new technology to the private sector, hopefully with large financial 
returns. 273 However, such an attitude represents a misunderstanding 
of the entrepreneurial nature of faculty researchers. Principal 
Investigators are indeed entrepreneurial. As noted above, Principal 
Investigators have been analogized to CEOs due to the leadership of 
the laboratory.274 In fact the nature of running a laboratory, including 
funding resources and publication, can also be analogized to a 
business cycle. Unfortunately for university technology transfer 
offices, the incentives of the research business cycle are often different 
from incentives that apply to corporations. An understanding of the 
entrepreneurial business cycle of research and the incentives at 
various points on the cycle may reveal better techniques for 
272. See discussion of university laboratories acting as independent firms within a 
university supra Part II.A. 
273. See Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19; see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
27 4. See supra Part II.A. 
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incentivizing faculty researchers to choose to take part in university 
technology transfer initiatives. 
A. The Academic Research Business Cycle 
The problem facing universities trying to encourage faculty 
members to embrace the goals of technology transfer is not a lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit among faculty. Rather, the problem is the lack 
of understanding of the nature of that entrepreneurial spirit. The 
university's technology transfer office acts much like the prototypical 
entrepreneur looking for the best and most profitable ways to transfer 
technology to the private sector.275 Policymakers and scholars viewing 
the universities' embrace of such technology transfer techniques276 do 
not understand the faculty member's reluctance to accept these same 
incentives.277 Even authors who acknowledge that academic 
entrepreneurship may be different from private industry 
entrepreneurship do not recognize the idea that academic 
entrepreneurship may not be commercial in nature at all. 278 
Understanding the distinction between the academic researcher and 
the university allows scholars to redefine the concept of 
entrepreneurship in the context of academic research, and to use that 
definition to properly incentivize academic researchers. 
Faculty members can be viewed as small business owners in 
many respects. The Principal Investigator, above analogized to a 
CEO, runs the lab much like a small firm within the university.279 
She alone determines the best course of research, develops a business 
plan (grant proposal), and procures funding by convincing investors 
(the National Institutes of Health or the Department of Energy, for 
example) to invest in her ideas (fund the grant). Once she has 
funding, the Principal Investigator hires and manages people to make 
her product (carry out her research) as efficiently as possible, both 
economically and time-wise. Once her research yields profit (research 
data or new technology), she determines the most effective way to 
275. The statistics published each year by AUTM are an indication that universities 
value the license revenue from patents. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88. Additionally, such 
revenue is a source of cachet to the university. See Dreyfuss, supra note 94 (discussing the trend 
for universities to view successful technology transfer offices as prestige-increasing). 
276. See Dreyfuss, supra note 94, at 464-66. 
277. Cf. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272 (listing reasons why 
researchers might choose to ignore requirements to disclose inventions to tech transfer officer). 
278. See Nicola Lacetera, Academic Entrepreneurship, 30 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
443, 443-44 (2009) (analyzing the difference between academic and private industry 
entrepreneurship in the context of a response to options to commercialize). 
279. Etzkowitz, supra note 23. 
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reinvest her profits (typically publication, but perhaps technology 
disclosure and patenting) to begin the cycle again and achieve 
business stability (future funding and tenure). To say that such a 
process does not require entrepreneurial spirit is to completely 
misunderstand the motivations of the academic researcher. 
Based on the way a Principal Investigator runs her laboratory, 
it is easy to see that faculty members have motivations that are 
similar to small business owners. Both desire to determine 
individualized paths that will benefit them in the long run. However, 
personal profits do not motivate academic researchers in the same 
way that they motivate a small business owner. In fact, most 
academic researchers could make significantly more money 
performing very similar research in private industry, but choose to 
take less pay to work on personally interesting problems. Both need 
to produce the best product possible and determine the best way to use 
past success to build new growth. 
B. Usage of Monetary Incentives 
The largest distinction between an entrepreneurial faculty 
member and a small business owner is the desire for money.2BO Money 
is much less of a motivator for an academic researcher to perform 
research than it is for a business owner to go into business. Although 
funding is important to the academic researcher, after a relatively 
steady salary is paid to the researcher, excess funds generally go 
toward conducting more research. 281 Academic researchers do not 
write exceedingly large grant proposals in the hope that they will 
become correspondingly rich. 
Unfortunately for the university, the university's largest 
incentive to encourage faculty to disclose new technology is the 
sharing of profits with the faculty inventor if the invention is 
commercialized. This profit-sharing incentive historically has not 
been sufficient to incentivize researchers. Practically speaking, less 
than 50 percent of inventions with commercial potential are disclosed 
to the university before publication.2s2 Empirical studies that have 
shown the profit-sharing incentive to be of limited value to academic 
280. Aghion, Dewatipont & Stein, supra note 42, at 621. 
281. Many grants include a salary limitation. Thus, while some of the funds of any given 
grant may go toward a researcher's salary, that salary is capped. See, e.g., Northwestern 
University, Office for Sponsored Research, NIH Salary Cap, 
http://www.research.northwestern.edu/osrlb_salary_limit.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
282. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272. 
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researchers explain the low participation in commercialization on the 
part of researchers.283 
Such a result should be unsurprising. These monetary 
incentives of sharing profits upon commercialization are unlikely to be 
efficient motivators for academic researchers because such incentives 
do not influence a major decision of the business cycle of academic 
researchers. Once a researcher has a new technology, she must 
determine the best use of the technology and her time in order to 
continue to receive more funding and job stability such as tenure. 
While an invention disclosure may result in funding in the distant 
future, the academic researcher may decide that publication and 
further grant writing is a better use of her time than filing an 
invention disclosure, unless there are industrial contacts waiting to 
license the new technology. Such a decision is probably rational. In 
2007, universities filed new patent applications on only 60 percent of 
invention disclosures that academic researchers filed with the 
university.2B4 It is unclear how many of those applications proceeded 
to the licensing stage, but with only 4,419 new licenses signed, 
including licenses for inventions from previous years, the possibility 
that a new invention will yield a large return is relatively slim. 285 
Additionally, once a potential licensee is found, the researcher has no 
input as to the terms of the license. 286 Thus, even if profit sharing 
might incentivize a researcher, the fact that the researcher has no 
control over the amount of revenue that the technology will generate 
decreases such incentives. 
Incentives, either monetary or otherwise, aimed at the decision 
of disclosure would be far more effective. For instance, credit toward 
tenure for patents (or even invention disclosures whether or not the 
university chose to pursue a patent) would be far more likely to 
incentivize academic researchers to disclose a new invention than the 
potential for future earnings. Monetary prizes directed at funding 
research to further develop the new technology might also be an 
incentive to disclosure, as such prizes would directly impact the ability 
of the academic researcher to continue research. 
283. Id. at 1273. 
284. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88. 
285. Id. 
286. In fact, the prestige of the academic research has no effect on the license terms 
granted. Elfenbein, supra note 53, at 689. 
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C. Overcoming Social Norms against Commercialization 
In addition to the current misapplication of monetary 
incentives, academic researchers are often bound by social norms that 
conflict with or are perceived to conflict with the university's interest 
in technology transfer. 287 The publication norm is of immense concern 
to many academic researchers as it directly impacts the tenure 
prospects of a faculty member. Faculty members often do not 
understand that publication and university commercialization can and 
should co-exist. Educating faculty about intellectual property rights, 
explaining the potential bars to protection, and describing a best 
practice for incorporating both publication and commercialization 
could fairly easily resolve this problem. 
More troubling to many faculty members is the potential 
violation of the norm of free sharing of information and technology. It 
is difficult to incentivize an academic researcher to disclose a new 
technology if she believes that such disclosure will limit the ability of 
others to use her invention due to restrictive licensing agreements 
with industry.288 Additionally, recent studies have shown that one of 
the largest impediments to technology sharing has become inter-
university material transfer agreements, as each university becomes 
more protective of technology created within its halls. 289 Such 
problems may leave academic researchers feeling as though 
intellectual property protection creates more problems than it solves. 
There are several ways to address this problem. Education 
regarding the importance of intellectual property and the best way to 
transition academic inventions to the public is a key component of 
changing the way academic researchers think about intellectual 
property protection for new inventions. 290 In fact, once a Principal 
Investigator buys into the concept of invention disclosure and 
commercialization, other members of the laboratory, especially 
graduate students, become far more accepting of the concept.291 
Listening to the academic researcher and working to cooperate 
with her to accomplish some free dissemination may also directly 
287. See supra Part II.B. 
288. See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 159 (citing examples of researchers who prefer free 
dissemination over licensing); supra Part II.B (discussing the social norms of free dissemination 
of research). 
289. Walsh, Cohen & Cho, supra note 55, 1185-86; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & 
Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, Sci., Sept. 23, 2005, at 
2002-03. 
290. Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: Organization 
Change at the Individual Level, 19 ORG. SCI. 69, 84-86 (2008). 
291. !d. 
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address the norm perceived to be in conflict with technology transfer. 
An academic researcher who believes that her invention should be 
freely disseminated may be correct. Some inventions are easily 
disseminated without licenses or large investments. Computer 
software is a prototypical case. Many computer scientists would 
prefer to release software under an open source distribution.292 Such 
open source software could be widely distributed and improved upon 
with little investment by users. In such cases, the university should 
listen to the input of the researcher and find a way to transfer the 
technology without tying the invention with intellectual property 
rights. 
In more complicated cases, development of a technology may 
require high levels of investment, requiring exclusive rights to attract 
investors. Again, communication between academic researchers and 
the university will be essential. If the university can preserve some 
means of free distribution of the technology, such as by reserving a 
non-commercial research license for universities or executing narrow 
licenses limited to one element or field of use for the invention, 
academic researchers might be more likely to disclose inventions to 
the university. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Practical examination of the structure and function of academic 
laboratories illustrate how patent law should view the distinct nature 
of academic researchers within the university. The university 
structure stands in contrast to the relationship that scientists working 
within industry have with a corporate employer. Additionally, social 
norms within the academic research community further strengthen 
the distinction. Academic researchers value those social norms, which 
often underlie the idea of independence from the university. For 
instance, academic freedom highlights the idea that academic 
researchers conduct research programs without true university 
oversight. Also, norms related to free dissemination of data speak to 
the often divergent goals and incentives of the university and its 
faculty. Finally, patent law has implicitly recognized the distinction 
between the university and its academic researchers in the context of 
patent ownership and sovereign immunity. 
This distinction between the university and its faculty 
researchers has implications for the application of the experimental 
use exception to patent infringement by academic researchers. 
292. See WASHBURN, supra note 10. 
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Current case law abolishes the use of the experimental use exception 
for university infringement. This author posits that the case law 
should be read so as to limit such infringement liability to 
institutional infringement rather than abolishing the experimental 
use exception for individual academic researchers. Analysis of the 
application of the defense should focus on the business interests of the 
researcher rather than those of the university. A business interest of 
an academic researcher has not yet been defined. 
Finally, the distinction between the university and its 
researchers sheds light on the entrepreneurial nature of the academic 
researcher. Academic researchers are highly entrepreneurial, albeit 
in an unorthodox manner that does not focus on personal monetary 
incentives. In fact, the pattern of research can be analogized to a 
business cycle with multiple decision points. Once the entrepreneurial 
nature of the academic researcher is better understood, new incentives 
and strategies can be implemented to increase technology transfer 
participation by academic researchers by focusing on the decision 
points important to researchers. 
